

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information
Official Diary

Thursday, 2 October 1952

1. Dr. Hoover phoned and stated that ICIS (Mr. Whearty) was not prepared to give its suggestions for amendment of the summary evaluation until after a meeting to be held on Monday or Tuesday of next week. I attempted to get in touch with General Samford, but was unsuccessful. Accordingly, I advised Dr. Hoover that we would have to proceed with our amendments, and that we could only consider the ICIS suggestions on their merits when they were submitted. This might be after we had given the summary evaluation to DCI.

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2. Informed [redacted] who phoned, that I would advise him by Sunday, either directly or through Mr. Wisner, as to the status of his application for rotation within the Intelligence Offices. Later spoke to Mr. Wisner and informed him that no position had appeared to be open in any of the Intelligence Offices and he undertook to carry through with [redacted] 25X1A9a Also passed this information by phone to [redacted] 25X1A9a

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3. At the Deputies' meeting, [redacted] mentioned that [redacted] of I&S was taking a trip [redacted] in connection with MIC and I requested 25X1A6a that [redacted] chat with me before leaving.

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5. Arranged to see Philip Graham of the Washington Post on Monday next, at his home.

6. Mr. Noyes of the office of Frank Nash in Defense phoned and stated that it would be most helpful if the summary evaluation could be available for review by the Secretaries on Thursday next. I assured him that we would do everything in our power to accomplish this.

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7. Spoke with [redacted] who raised certain problems of security in connection with the current oil suit. I later reported this conversation orally to DCI.

8. Discussed with Dr. Kent, and then with Dr. Kent and DCI, the desirability of a crash estimate on Iran to be ready not later than Wednesday next. This estimate was laid on.

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9. Dr. Chadwell phoned, being concerned about the proposal, made through Amory or his people, that O/SI participate in the revision of MC-33. I assured Dr. Chadwell that participation was at his option and, since he desired not to go along on this exercise in view of his over-all relations, I approved. We agreed that there should be no CIA delegates at this meeting.

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10. Mr. Amory later phoned me and informed me that certain CIA representatives had been designated as delegates to sit in meetings with the [REDACTED] on the revision of MC-33. I explained to Mr. Amory that this was contrary to the understanding that I had had with General Porter and for many policy reasons was wholly unacceptable to CIA. I requested him to have this situation straightened out. He later phoned and informed me that CIA representatives would not sit in on the conference, but would confine themselves to advising the American delegation. As a personal favor to General Porter, he had agreed that there would appear to be no need to have withdrawn the name [REDACTED] who was really a CIA man but was not designated as such and who would not sit in the meetings. I approved this upon the express understanding that Porter would make it plain to all concerned that CIA was not participating in this conference, officially or unofficially.

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11. [REDACTED] reported to me in some detail on his briefing of Governor Stevenson and the various questions and answers. At my suggestion, he briefed DCI orally on this.

12. Discussed briefly with General Magruder various revisions to the Brownell Committee directive and I tentatively agreed with the suggestion he raised respecting the delegation issue.

13. Mr. Lay phoned and stated that they had received an alternate State draft on the policy paper re Iran. Accordingly, they would be most appreciative to have an advance distribution to members of the Senior Staff of our crash Iran estimate coming out Wednesday. I undertook to have this done and later mentioned this to Sherman Kent.

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14. [REDACTED] phoned respecting contact with a Colonel Piers and I approved the action he proposed to take. I also made arrangements for a briefing by [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

15. Dr. Craig of PSB informed me that DCI had requested the PSB staff to look into the question of any action the Soviets might be contemplating respecting the UN and requested our assistance. I informed Dr. Craig of the background of this suggestion and stated that we had no intelligence

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reports as such on the subject, although I reviewed with him the various general reports that I had mentioned in my memorandum to DCI.

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16. [REDACTED] reported to me on the status of reports on [REDACTED] and the State Department. [REDACTED] had given conflicting reports and they were continuing their investigation.

17. In the evening, Dr. Chadwell phoned and informed me that there had been a British atomic blast and, after some consideration, we determined not to bother DCI during the evening.

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